SELF NODE
Capability Router • Capabilities before keys. Proof before mutation.
Inference call (proxied) and public-signal capture from X threads.
- Required env (names only)
- GROK_API_KEY
- Proof requirement
- Request id and token / cost line for the inference; thread URL plus Grok response hash captured before any reply is composed.
- Human approval
- Per-session auth for inference. Operator plus RoundTable review for any outbound post.
Open branch, pull request, or comment as the durable proof ledger.
- Required env (names only)
- —
- Proof requirement
- Proof-packet body referencing the packet id, signed-off-by trailer, and passing CI.
- Human approval
- Operator approval before any write or merge.
Authenticated user write through adapters with RLS enforcement.
- Required env (names only)
- NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URLNEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_ANON_KEY
- Proof requirement
- Adapter pattern (server-side auth.uid() injection, caller user_id stripped) plus RLS WITH CHECK pass.
- Human approval
- Per-session auth.
Read deploy and env-presence metadata only.
- Required env (names only)
- —
- Proof requirement
- Deploy id plus commit SHA captured into the packet.
- Human approval
- None for read; operator approval required for any redeploy or env mutation.
Multi-actor inspection of proof packets before any write or mutate capability fires.
- Required env (names only)
- —
- Proof requirement
- Verdict log entry referencing the proof-packet id and the participating actors.
- Human approval
- Operator-driven; the verdict itself is the approval artifact.
Anchor evidence to durable memory with a trust-decay index.
- Required env (names only)
- NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URLNEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_ANON_KEY
- Proof requirement
- Evidence anchor referencing the source of the claim and the theorem it supports.
- Human approval
- Per-session auth.
Packet derivation plus decision log.
- Required env (names only)
- NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URLNEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_ANON_KEY
- Proof requirement
- Packet body and a decision-log entry tied to that packet.
- Human approval
- Per-session auth.
Resolve canonical author or paper identifiers.
- Required env (names only)
- —
- Proof requirement
- Request id plus the canonical DOI or IRI captured.
- Human approval
- None.
Read invoice and runway state.
- Required env (names only)
- —
- Proof requirement
- Snapshot id and a redacted summary; raw amounts kept out of public surfaces.
- Human approval
- Operator approval for reads; dual-operator approval for any movement of funds.
Operator-owned read of private coordination threads.
- Required env (names only)
- —
- Proof requirement
- Request id and a thread hash. Raw thread content is never persisted as evidence.
- Human approval
- Operator approval.
- 01SignalInbound observation from any external surface.
- 02ClaimThe falsifiable assertion the signal carries.
- 03Capability requestSpecifies the surface and verb being requested, plus the registry row.
- 04RoundTable reviewMulti-actor inspection step before any write or mutate capability fires.
- 05Approved actionCapability invoked under the minimal bound role.
- 06EvidenceProof packet anchored to IEF.
- 07MemoryDurable anchor plus the trust-decay index.
Every write or mutate capability passes through RoundTable review before invocation. Reads can skip review but still produce evidence anchored to memory.
Operator-minutes reclaimed per occurrence of the capability.
Bounded by the rollback note reversibility.
Count and durability of new artifacts attached to the packet.
Distinct actors who can now act on a previously private signal.
Surface area removed from the operator working-memory budget.
IEF-side decay-model delta after the artifact is anchored.
Bounded ranges plus the financial entry id; only when the Billing surface is touched.
A capability that does not move at least one axis is not invoked.
| Altitude | Meaning | Example |
|---|---|---|
Orbit orbit | Vision overlay; not yet a formal claim. | "CFE coordinates a field" framing. |
High altitude high_altitude | Candidate formalism; theorem-shaped, untested. | rendering-math v0.1 operators. |
Mid altitude mid_altitude | Canon or roadmap; agreed direction, no runtime. | selfnode-capability-map-v0.1, PUBLIC_LAYER.md. |
Low altitude low_altitude | Fixture or scaffold; UI exists, data is mock. | /cosmos page and mock adapter rows. |
Ground ground | Tested runtime; CI green, RLS enforced. | migrations 001-013, /api/health, /diagnostics. |
Proof proof | What keeps it on the ground. | RLS_SMOKE.md, smoke:rls script, ledger artifact. |
A capability is invocable only from Ground or Proof. Anything Orbit / High / Mid / Low requires elevation through SelfNode (registry update plus RoundTable approval) before any external call fires.
Every public signal enters as untrusted. Admission decides what observes, waits, routes, decays, or becomes proof.
Static immune-system reference. No runtime enforcement. Mirrors docs/security/public-signal-threat-model-v0.1.md.
- 01External signalexternal_signal
A new observation arrives from an external surface (post, mention, DM, citation).
- 02Intakeintake
Record the raw signal immutably with a timestamp and source identifier.
- 03Provenance checkprovenance_check
Bind the signal to a durable identity and assess sender continuity.
- 04Deduplicationdeduplication
Collapse equivalent signals; bump recurrence on the canonical row.
- 05Spoof / swarm checkspoof_swarm_check
Identity binding plus rate, co-occurrence, and brigading detection.
- 06Claim extractionclaim_extraction
Reduce the signal to one or more falsifiable claims; sanitise content from instruction-shaped text.
- 07Evidence requirementevidence_requirement
State the artifact that would settle each extracted claim.
- 08Risk classificationrisk_classification
Assign low / medium / high risk and bound blast radius and reversibility.
- 09Admission decisionadmission_decision
Emit exactly one admission action (observe, quarantine, route, escalate, discard).
- 10Route / quarantine / decay / discardroute_quarantine_decay_discard
Carry out the admission action; record metadata for future cycles.
- 11Proof packet / memoryproof_packet_memory
Only when admitted and an evidence artifact has landed, anchor the result as a proof packet in IEF.
Each stage is a checkpoint. Failed checkpoints route to quarantine, decay, or discard. Proof packet only on admit + evidence.
- Failure mode
- Drowns intake; exhausts operator attention budget.
- Defence stage
- deduplication + provenance_check (rate-window)
- Failure mode
- Borrowed credibility; injected claims attributed to durable account.
- Defence stage
- provenance_check + sender-continuity binding
- Failure mode
- Manufactured "many people are saying" without independent corroboration.
- Defence stage
- admission_decision (independence-of-evidence)
- Failure mode
- Synchronised flood directed at a single target or claim.
- Defence stage
- spoof_swarm_check (co-occurrence test)
- Failure mode
- Cite-of-cite-of-rumour passed off as a primary source.
- Defence stage
- evidence_requirement + provenance walk
- Failure mode
- Attacker text mutates downstream agent behaviour when consumed.
- Defence stage
- claim_extraction (treat reply text as data, never instructions)
- Failure mode
- Fabricated screenshots, quotes, or documents passed as evidence.
- Defence stage
- evidence_requirement + artifact verification (hash, source)
- Failure mode
- Real artifact created solely to win the argument it cites.
- Defence stage
- admission_decision (recurrence + independence + skeptic route)
- Failure mode
- Build credibility now to spend later on a poisoned claim.
- Defence stage
- provenance_check (sender-continuity, decay)
- Failure mode
- Volume designed to make the human give up and admit.
- Defence stage
- risk_classification + admission_decision (auto-quarantine high-volume sources)
- Failure mode
- Maximise hysteresis until coherence drops.
- Defence stage
- admission_decision (hysteresis cap; route to skeptic + RoundTable)
- Failure mode
- Bot-on-bot amplification with no human gate.
- Defence stage
- route_quarantine_decay_discard (no autonomous publish; manual gate at action)
- Failure mode
- Inject a claim into the public surface so it reads as the official story.
- Defence stage
- route_quarantine_decay_discard (publish gated by projection policy; raw-table access denied)
- Failure mode
- True quote, false framing.
- Defence stage
- claim_extraction + provenance walk (full-context capture in proof packet)
- Failure mode
- Cheap reach masquerading as legitimate signal strength.
- Defence stage
- admission_decision (velocity vs evidence-velocity ratio + decay)
Strength of identity binding to a durable account, signed source, or canonical id.
Historical track record of the source over previous cycles.
Count of evidence artifacts not derivable from the same source as the claim.
Independent observations of the same claim across distinct cycles.
Fraction of recent signals from the same source that contradict each other.
Rate at which independent evidence accumulates per unit time.
Wall-clock time between claim and the first artifact that materially supports or falsifies it.
Number of downstream surfaces that would change state if this signal is admitted.
Cost / time to undo any action triggered by admitting this signal.
Operator-minutes consumed if admission is granted.
Current decay coefficient on the source standing memory.
Count of valuation-map axes the signal would move if proven.
Whether admission would expose any field that violates the public projection policy.
Record without surfacing; cheap and reversible.
Admit to a holding lens; no downstream effects until escalation.
Collapse into an existing signal; bump recurrence.
Emit an evidence-requirement notice; block admission until an artifact is anchored.
Assign to a contrarian reviewer whose explicit job is to falsify.
Multi-actor inspection before any write or mutate capability fires.
Anchor as an evidence candidate; not yet admitted as canonical.
Escalate for human decision; spends operator attention budget.
Drop with timestamp; recurrence may reopen at a higher cost.
Promote risk class; trigger dual-approval before any further action.
Project the proof packet onto the public layer; only after the projection policy authorises.
Only publish_public_artifact is gated post-proof; every other action may run before an artifact lands.
- Trust decays when unattendeddecay_when_unattended
Every cycle without follow-through subtracts from the source standing.
- Evidence slows decayevidence_slows_decay
Anchoring an artifact resets the decay clock for the related claim.
- Attention restores coordinationattention_restores_coordination
A deliberately answered signal recovers more standing than passive observation.
- Swarm noise increases attention debtswarm_noise_increases_attention_debt
When intake rate far exceeds admission rate, every unprocessed signal compounds the operator working-memory load.
- Unresolved recurrence increases hysteresisunresolved_recurrence_increases_hysteresis
Repeated unresolved contradiction makes returning to coherence more expensive (hysteresis H grows).
- 01X thread signalx_thread_signal
Public signal surface; captured at intake as URL plus rendered snapshot.
claim only - 02Grok stress testgrok_stress_test
Stress-test signal. Output is treated as a claim, never as ground truth.
claim only - 03GitHub proof ledgergithub_proof_ledger
Durable trace of which signals were admitted, which were quarantined, and what evidence was anchored.
- 04RoundTable inspectionroundtable_inspection
Multi-actor review for any admission action that targets RoundTable.
- 05IEF artifact lensief_artifact_lens
Evidence candidate store with the trust-decay state per claim.
- 06Operator field testoperator_field_test
Bounded human-authorised field test; the only path to publish-as-public-artifact.
Non-endorsed routing chain. None of these stages are implemented. Stages marked claim only produce input, never ground truth: an X thread or Grok reply is data the admission pipeline still has to verify.
- No secrets in repo. No env values, real keys, JWTs, refresh tokens, wallet addresses, or DB URLs in code, commits, PR bodies, or chat. Names only.
- No autonomous mutation. Every write or mutate capability requires human approval ahead of invocation.
- High-risk capabilities require explicit operator approval (or dual-operator approval for movement of funds).
- Proof packet required before any write or mutate capability fires. A theorem without evidence is a slogan; evidence without a theorem is a heap.
- Service-role keys stay server-only. Never imported from a client component, never under
NEXT_PUBLIC_*, never logged.